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Buker: Action Under State Law: Florida's Blue Key and Common Law Alterna

ACTION UNDER STATE LAW: FLORIDA'S BLUE SKY
AND COMMON LAW ALTERNATIVES TO RULE lOb-5 FOR
RELIEF IN SECURITIES FRAUD
INTRODUCTION
2
The Securities Exchange Act of 19341 [the Act] has, since its enactment,
been the primary source of relief for securities fraud while state law has been
relegated to an ancillary status. s The circuit courts of appeal had dramatically
expanded the narrow language of section 10-b and rule l0b-54 until they
eclipsed all other sources of relief for securities manipulation and deception.
However, recent Supreme Court rulings have just as dramatically restricted the
scope of these provisions5 and a plaintiff can no longer invoke the Act and be
confident of sympathetic judicial interpretation and lenient elements of action.6

1. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §10, 15 U.S.C. §78 (1976). As originally promulgated,
§10-b makes it unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange, to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Securities and Exchange Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or protection of investors. Id. §78j.
2. See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT Or 1934 18 (Ellenberger & Mahar
1973). One of the most important policies behind the Act was to curb misuse of inside information in the trading of securities. The Act was designed to substitute the philosophy of
full disclosure for that of caveat emptor and to protect the investing public from the abuses
of insiders. For judicial articulation of this policy see, e.g., Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792
(5th Cir. 1970); Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2nd Cir. 1969). The
federal law was so successful that most state legislation and judicial interpretation has tracked
federal law. The Uniform Securities Act's antifraud provision follows rule lOb-5 even to the
extent of omitting authorization of civil relief and requiring judicial interpretation on that
point. Ratner, Federal and State Roles In The Regulation of Insider Trading, 31 Bus. LAw.
947, 950-51 (1976).
3. As long as the Act was able to grant relief, all other alternatives have been largely
ignored. When state law has been considered in this context, it has been mainly as an ancillary
action for the purpose of increasing damages. Punitive damages are not authorized under the
Act, but are available in common law fraud actions. This is made possible by provisions of
the Act which allow state law remedies as long as they do not run counter to the federal law.
Note, The Availability of Variant State Remedies for Pendent State Fraud Claims Actionable
Under the FederalSecurities Act, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1213, 1230-34 (1974).
4. 15 U.S.C. §78j (1976). Rule lOb-5 was promulgated pursuant to the authority granted
by §78w for the protection of investors. 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1979).
5. The trend of the recent Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Act has been very
restrictive, reversing what had been an expansive trend by the Circuit Courts of Appeals. Between 1975 and 1977, the Supreme Court added the element of scienter to the cause of action,
refused standing except to a purchaser or seller, and held that corporate mismanagement was
not actionable under the Act. See Santa Fe Indus. Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). See note 83 and accompanying text, infra.
6. Prior to the Supreme Court's restrictions of the Act, many circuit courts were willing
to grant wide latitude in its use. Scienter was often not an element of action, privity was not
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The plaintiff can now expect elements of action and problems of proof as
stringent and difficult as the most difficult action under common law 7 In
effect, this will often bar an action under the Act forcing the plaintiff to seek
relief under state law.8 Fortunately, the state statutory and common law, long
neglected as a primary source of relief for securities fraud, offer surprisingly
effective alternatives to the federal law. The plaintiff should be aware, however,
that while a state cause of action can often circumvent the difficulties of action
under the Act, state action also presents unique problems that may defeat the

unwary.

The recent case, Cameron v. Outdoor Resorts of America Inc.,9 illustrates
the need for a plaintiff defrauded in a securities transaction to consider bringing an action under state law. The plaintiffs in Cameron originally brought an
actiono pursdant to rile lOb-5 against Outdoor Resorts of America Inc., a
recreational land developer that sold recreational vehicle lots on a condominium plan."1 Outdoor Resorts presented this offer to the plaintiffs with optimistic
projections of occupancy, expense, and income which were not realized.12 The
plaintiffs' action under the Act for fraudulent representation in the sale of a
security was upheld by the lower court. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal
reversed, 3 finding that the plaintiffs had only shown negligent misrepresentation and had not met the requirement of scienter.14 Although it denied action
under the Act, the Fifth Circuit did not leave the plaintiff without a remedy,
but remanded the case for consideration under Florida's common law of negligent misrepresentation.1 5
required, and many went so far as to grant relief to plaintiffs who had not even traded. In
many of these courts there was a judicial policy of intense protection of a securities investor,
and the most difficult task for a plaintiff was to show a deception. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
7. The effect of the recent xestrictive trend has been to supplement the Act with elements
of action that are almost as stringent as those under common law fraud, one of the most
difficult common law actions to maintain. The element of scienter is now required in both,
and while privity is slighty more lenient under the Act, elements of privity have been imposed. In cases of nondisclosure, the Act is even more stringent than a common law action for
fraud, requiring a fiduciary relationship; fraud requires a duty to disclose, a somewhat wider
standard. See notes 231-235 and accompanying text, infra.
8. The federal law has always allowed state action in this area, and has never specifically
prohibited it. The effectiveness of the federal rules has usually relegated state action to a
pendent role in the federal courts, leaving the developments of federal law judicially unconsidered in the state courts. See 15 U.S.C. §78 bb(d) (1976). See also 2 S.GOLDBERG, FRAUDULENT BROKER-DEALER PRACriCEs, ch. 10 at 16 (1978).
9. 608 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1979), modified 611 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1980).
10. Id. at 192 n.l.
11. Id. at 191.
12. Id. Outdoor Resorts Inc. projected an 80% occupancy rate with a return of five dollars
per night to the owner. It further projected that each lot would cover the debt payments for
a block of 20 campsites. These overly optimistic projections induced the plaintiffs to purchase
45 lots at $6,000 each. Id.
13. Id. at 194.
14. Id. The plaintiffs had failed to allege scienter on the part of Outdoor Resorts Inc.
Scienter in this context is a "mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1333-34 (5th Cir. 1978).
1 .15. The case was remanded after rehearing, 611 F.2d 105, 107 (5th Cir. 1980). While the
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Florida's common law of negligent misrepresentation not only allowed the
plaintiffs in Cameron to circumvent the federal scienter requirement, but it
also imposed elements of action not present in federal law.16 If the plaintiffs
are not aware of these elements of action, such as privity, the state cause of
action, which has the potential of providing relief, may also fail. Thus in
Cameron the plaintiffs were left not only with an alternative to federal action,
but also with an alternative set of standards, some of which have not been
developed in relation to securities fraud,?7 and which, if ignored, could make
relief unavailable. This note outlines the possibilities and problems of the
state action under Florida law for securities fraud, which is destined to become
a major avenue of relief for defrauded Florida plaintiffs.
AcTION

UNDER THE Acrr, SECrION

10-b

AND RULE

1Ob-5

An appreciation of the possibilities and problems of the Florida law of
securities fraud requires a review and comparison of the federal provisions, including the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.18 Prior to 1934, a defrauded
purchaser or seller of securities was limited either to state common law 9 or
state securities statutes.2 0 Neither alternative was adequate.21 The complexity
Fifth Circuit used the language of fraud, it apparently meant negligent misrepresentation. The
court felt the defendant's actions fulfilled the elements of common law fraud: a false representation of a material fact, knowledge of the falsity or a negligent representation, intent to
induce action, and damage resulting from justifiable reliance on the representations. 608 F.2d
at 195-96. If the defendants had actual knowledge of the falsity of their representations then
they would have had the requisite scienter to make action under the Act possible. It is clear,
therefore, that the court was remanding this action for consideration under negligent misrepresentation because it had previously found scienter not to be present.
16. The plaintiffs escaped the scienter requirement of action under the Act, but they
incurred the burdens of establishing jurisdiction and privity under state law. Fortunately for
them, the representations were made within Florida and were made directly by the selling
party, fulfilling both elements not present in the Act. Id. at 191.
17. See note 8 supra.
18. 15 U.S.C. §78j (1976).
19. The common law at this time offered only erratic relief. In Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283
Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933), a director misused inside information to purchase shares
through a broker from several shareholders. In finding no liability the court stated "[t]he fact
that the defendants were directors created no fiduciary relation between them and the plaintiff in the matter of the sale of his stock." Id. at 361, 186 N.E. at 660. In Thompson v. Walker,
253 Mich. 126, 234 N.W. 144 (1931), however, the court, in imposing liability, found that the
directors and officers had a duty to act in the utmost good faith to see that their statements
to prospective shareholders were true. Id. at 136, 234 N.E. at 147. Generally, the majority took
the Goodwin view and refused to extend a fiduciary duty from an insider to a shareholder
with whom he had traded. See R. FROME & V. ROSENZWEIG, SALES OF SEcuRITIES BY CORPORATE

INSIDERS 234-35 (2d ed. 1975).
20. See Washburn & Steig, Control of Securities Selling, 31 MICH. L. REv. 768 (1933). At
the time the exchange act was passed, 43 states had blue sky laws. Id. at 769. Of these only
three had any antifraud provisions, while the rest required only licensing of seller and a
merit determination by the state securities board. The three states with antifraud provisions
allowed the attorney general to prosecute criminally for fraudulent transactions, but no state
offered any civil remedy. Every state had separate criminal statutes for fraud, but in practice
they were ineffective for fraud on a large scale and could not cope with the organized secur-
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of the national securities market and the faceless interstate transactions consummated through the exchange destroyed the privity22 necessary for common
law action and usually prevented the forum from gaining jurisdiction even if
a cause of action existed. 23 This relative inability of state law to control securities fraud resulted in rampant abuse of inside information24 and widespread
manipulation of the securities market. Congress responded with Section 10-b
of the Act 2s which was expanded by the Securities and Exchange Commission
through rule 10b-5.26 Congress intended to substitute a policy of full disclosure
for caveat emptor and to protect persons trading in securities.27 Section 10b
and rule lOb-5 were inforceable by the SEC through both criminal and injunctive action 28 and were to regulate those interstate transactions that state
law had been unable to control.29 As originally envisioned the SEC, acting
ities manipulation common at that time. Id. See also Bartell, Federal State Relations Under
the FederalSecurities Code, 32 VAND. L. REV. 457, 463 n.32 (1979).
21. The many states that had blue sky laws in 1933, including those with rigid standards
and antifraud provisions, were dissatisfied with their effectiveness. Washburn & Steig, supra
note 20, at 768-69. Congress also considered state law inadequate in this area. S. REP. No.
792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SEcuRIIES AcT or
1933 AND SECURruIas ExCHANGE ACr or 1934 12 (Ellenberger & Mahar 1973). See also Note, supra
note 3, at 1229.
22. The largely interstate nature of securities transactions was beyond the reach of most
state laws at a time when long arm statutes were unknown. Even if jurisdiction could be
established, the use of brokers negated the privity requirement, while the requirement of
scienter remained as difficult probatively as it is today.
23. Fraud was actionable at this time in all jurisdictions, but the elements of the action
were very stringent. See Comment, Fraud-Right of Buyer to Rely on Seller's Representations
as to Value of Stock, 19 VA. L. REv. 299 (1933). A plaintiff's action was limited to misrepresntation of fact and not opinion, and he must have exercised reasonable care in his own behalf. If
the plaintiff had freedom to investigate no cause of action would lie, despite what the investigation failed to reveal. Nonsuit would also result if there was no fiduciary relationship
and the subject matter was equally available to both parties. Id. at 300-01. See also Note, The
Liability of Directorsand Officers For Misrepresentationin the Sale of Securities, 34 COLUM.
L. REv. 1090, 1094-97 (1934).
24. See Stock Exchange Practices, Letter from the Counsel for Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency (to Senate Banking and Currency Committee), Under S. Rep. 84, 72d
Cong. (Feb. 18, 1933), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SEcURITS ACr OF 1933 AND
SEcuRITrs EXCHANGE Acr OF 1934 3 (Ellenberger & Mahar 1973). See note 2 supra.
25. See note I and accompanying text, supra.
26. 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1979). Rule lOb-5 makes any use of a device or scheme to defraud unlawful, and does not differentiate between violations of ommission or commission. Id.
§a. It also specifically prohibits an omission which makes other statements misleading, calling
for full disclosure if anything is said. Id. §b.
27. "It is clear that the statute was intended to create a form of fiduciary relationship
between so-called corporate insiders and outsiders with whom they deal in company securities
which places upon the insiders duties more exacting than mere abstention from what generally is thought to be fraudulent practices." Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637 (7th Cir.
1963).
28. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 §21 (e), 15 U.S.C. §78u(e) (1976).
29. S. REP. No. 792, 73rd Cong. 2d Sess. 1-5 (1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
TmE SECURrriES ACT OF 1933 AND SEcumrTis EXCHANGE AcT OF 1934 (Ellenberger & Mahar
1973). One of the main deficiencies of state laws at this time was their being limited to criminal sanction. None provided for civil relief which was considered far more effective in controlling abuse. Id.
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pursuant to the authority of the Act, was to be the primary check on securities
abuse while private action under state law occupied a secondary position.
Following the liberal policy of full disclosure, 30 the courts dramatically expanded the Act to afford generous relief.31 The courts relaxed the elements of
action, and expanded the use of section 10b by opening its provisions to private
plaintiffs as well as the SEC. 32 Initially, only plaintiffs defrauded by actual misrepresentation could obtain relief, but the section was judicially extended to
cases of nondisclosure 33 where the information not disclosed would be considered important by a reasonable investor. 4 The class of potential plaintiffs
was also expanded by the judicial interpretation of rule lOb-5 to negate the
requirement of privity of contract between buyer and seller. 35 The courts
allowed plaintiffs who had never directly traded with the defendant, but who
had used the medium of the exchange, to bring action under the Act.36 Early

30. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969). "The core of Rule lOb-5 is the implementation of the Congressional purpose that all
investors should have equal access to the rewards of participation in securities transactions. It
was the intent of Congress that all members of the investing public should be subject to
identical market risks, including risk that one's evaluative capacity or one's capital available
to put at risk may exceed another's capacity or capital." Id. at 851-52.
31. See, e.g., Financial Indus. Fund Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973); A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967);
Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
32. The most potent protection for investors is the ability to bring a civil action for
damages. The profit motive was considered to be more effective than sole reliance on governmental action. See, e.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
The judiciary viewed §10b of the Exchange Act as having the purpose of making the guilty
party answerable in civil damages, apart from any action the commission might take. This
implied provision for damages was, according to some courts, the essence of the deterrent
force of the act. Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 631 (9th Cir. 1953).
33. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Mills v. Electric
Autolite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 796 (1969).
34. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972). This test is substituted for ordinary causal links in cases of misrepresentation. Without some form of implied causation, liability in cases of non-disclosure would be difficult, if not impossible to prove.
See generally Keeton, Fraud-Concealmentand Non-Disclosure 15 TEx. L. R~v. 1 (1936).
35. See Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1004 (1971). Here plaintiffs had sold through an exchange and had no privity with the purchasers who had perpetrated the misrepresentations. The action was upheld, but the element
of causation was added. See note 81 and accompanying text, infra. Accord, Heit v. Weitzen,
402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1968).
36. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); Schoenbaum
v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); McManus v.
Jessup & Moore Paper Co., 3 S.E.C. 1864 (E.D. Pa. 1948). But see Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). An exception to the
purchase or sale requirement has always been found if the plaintiff is only seeking to obtain
injunctive relief and not damages. Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d
Cir. 1967). This has remained true even after the later more restrictive decisions imposed a
strict requirement for a purchase or sale.
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cases went so far as to afford relief to parties that had not traded, but were
damaged by not having done so.37
The courts also expanded the application of rule 101>5 to the more peripheral areas of the securities market. For example, the courts used the rule to
qualitatively review the actions of corporate insiders. 38 Where action had been
previously allowed for an insider's manipulation of an investor's ignorance, it
became possible to obtain relief under rule lob-5 for an insider's breach of
fiduciary duty.3 9 This became a potent ground for action,40 and in some cases
was applied to corporate mismanagement and insider negligence.4 1 The judicial application of rule lOb-5 to corporate mismanagement, coupled with the
policy of granting relief in the absence of a trade, gave indications, that if
unchecked, rule lob-5 had the potential of becoming an omnibus provision for
federal regulation of corporate action.42
As the courts expanded the class of plaintiffs and application of rule 101>5,44
43
they also expanded the class of potential defendants. Initially, only insiders
37. Id.
38. There is a long history of state actions enforcing fiduciary duties of corporate insiders
to the corporation and its shareholders. See Flight Equip. & Eng. Corp. v. Shelton, 103 So. 2d
615, 626-27 (Fla. 1958); Citizens State Bank v. Adams, 140 Fla. 578, 583, 193 So. 281, 283 (1939);
Renpack, Inc. v. Oppenheimer, 104 So. 2d 642, 644 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1958); Etheredge v.
Barrow, 102 So. 2d 660, 662 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1958); Diamond v. Oxeamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 496
(N.Y. 1969). While rule 10b-5 does not expressly address the problem of breach of corporate
fiduciary duty it can, by implication, be applicable. Since most breaches of corporate fiduciary
duty involve securities in some form and are accompanied by fraud, deceit or nondisclosure,
10b-5 was found to be applicable. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.,
404 U.S. 6 (1971). This case held that rule 10b must be read flexibly and that disregard of a
trust relationship (here that of a controlling shareholder to the corporation) is the same seamless web as manipulation and investor's ignorance. Id. at 12.
39. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
40. See note 38 supra.
41. Early cases under rule lob-5 were split regarding the requirement of scienter. Thus
in a jurisdiction that did not require scienter, negligent breach of fiduciary duty could often
be an implied cause of action under rule lOb-5 in the same manner as a fraudulent breach of
fiduciary duty. See White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 1974); Smallwood v. Pearl
Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 606 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); Lanza v. Drexel
479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1973). Since Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), a
civil action for damages now requires scienter. See also note 117 infra.
42. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, (1972); Superintendent
of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446
F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); Kardon v. National Gypsum Corp., 73
F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
43. Both §10b and rule lob-5 only narrow the class of potential defendants to persons
who violate the law by means of the use of an instrumentality of interstate commerce or mail
or of a facility of a national securities exchange. Specificity in this area was deliberately left
to judicial interpretation. See 15 U.S.C. 78j (1976); 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1979).
44. Although an insider is usually involved in a trade, this need not be so. A plaintiff who
has traded was able to bring action against insiders who, although not trading, had misused
inside information to defraud the plaintiff. Generally, the following types of abuse are
actionable: concealment of a material fact, use of misleading statement, use of a fraudulent
device, preparation of misleading statements, and withholding information from minority
shareholders. See Errion v. Conneli, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956); Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d
627 (9th Cir. 1953).
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who actually made a purchase or sale 45 were liable under the rule. The courts
soon enlarged the concept of "insider" to include anyone who possessed inside
information of value to a reasonably speculative investor.46 They used this expanded concept to impose liability on third parties who did not take part in a
trade,47 such as brokers,48 controlling persons, 49 and accountants.5- The courts
45. This narrow application of the Act soon expanded as rapidly as the inventiveness of
plaintiffs' attorneys would allow. Now the purchase or sale requirement is a restriction on the
class of plaintiffs that have standing, but has nothing to do with determination of the class of
defendants.
46. The term "insider" originally referred to corporate officers and directors who were
privy to significant non-public information concerning the corporation in which they served.
This abuse of information by officers and directors was one of the primary motivations for
enacting the Act. See notes 1 & 2 supra. See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 796 (1969). See generally R. FROME & M. ROSENZWEIiG, supra
note 19.
This concept was expanded to impose vicarious liability on corporations and control
persons for the acts of their agents and employees. There is no doctrine of respondeat superior
in the Act, vicarious liability is imposed by statute. 15 U.S.C. §78t(a) (1976). The courts have
interpreted this statute to impose liability on corporations for the acts of their agents, but
have exempted officers and directors from liability unless they participated personally.
Cameron v. Outdoor Resorts of America, Inc., 611 F.2d 105, 107 (5th Cir. 1980); Hudak v.
Economic Research Analysts, Inc., 499 F.2d 996, 1002 (5th Cir. 1974); Lanza v. Drexel, 479
F.2d 1277, 1289 (2d Cir. 1973). The common law doctrine of respondeat superior has no
application under the Act. See SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Note,
Securities Regulation-Vicarious Liability for Securities Acts Violations By Common Law or
By Statute, 54 N.C. L. REV. 488, 488-89 (1976). See also Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502
F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Geon Indus. 381 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
47. Any nontrading party, such as an insider who becomes a tipper but not a trader, can
be considered an aider and abettor upon whom liability can be imposed. The early use of
rule lOb-5 facilitated actions against such parties, often allowing an imputation of scienter.
This imputation of scienter for aider and abettor was crucial since proof of intent is even
more difficult than in the case of a principal to the trade. The early law required that the
principal must have violated rule 10b-5 and that the aider must be aware that he is rendering
assistance, but scienter as to the violation of the securities act could be imputed if the
assistance was not normal activity for the aider. If the assistance was regular activity for the
aider, an intent on the aider's part to violate the securities laws was required. Woodward v.
Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 94-97 (5th Cir. 1975). See Comment, Establishment of
Liability for Aiding and Abetting Under Rule 10b-5 and the Common Law, 25 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 862, 865-73 (1978).
The federal cause of action was far superior to the common law remedies against aiders
and abettors. Under common law there was no liability in nondisclosure cases unless there was
first a duty to disclose. Since this often could not be found absent a fiduciary relationship, it
was seldom that common law afforded a remedy against aiders in nondisclosure cases. If
there was active misrepresentations common law was not much better. Scienter could not be
imputed as it could under the federal law and therefore it was necessary to show that the
aider had knowledge of the fraudulent character of the principal's acts and intended to
further them. Id. at 885-87. See 3A H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW
§§9.19 [2], .20 [1]-[2] (1979). This advantage of the federal over the common law was only under
the early cases. After Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) the situation is changed.
See note 117 infra.
48. Under early interpretation of rule lOb-5, brokers were considered insiders and scienter
was imputed to their actions if such actions were outside the normal range of their activities.
See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 235 (2d Cir. 1974);
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also imposed liability on parties far removed from what was traditionally considered to be a corporate insider, such as tippees5' who received their information from insiders and tippees of those tippees, liability 2 coming to rest on a
party remote from the initial source.13 The expansion of the classes of defendants, plaintiffs, and application of rule lOb-5 resulted in the Act being applied to virtually any corporate activity that affected the value of securities as
long as the elements of action under the rule could be met.
The elements of an action under section 10b and rule 10b-5 were much less

SEC v. Lur's, Inc., 265 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See generally D.
DEaER Lsamrry

BRODSKY,

BROKE-.

287 (1978); 2 S. GOLDBERG, supra note 10.

49. 15 U.S.C. §78t(a) (1979). Control persons are liable for violations of securities laws
pursuant to the provisions of federal statutes, not the common law doctrine of respondeat
superior. The federal acts impose liability only if the control person authorized or ratified the
employee's acts. This, of course, does not apply if the control person is a corporate entity. Because a corporate entity can only act through its agents, liability is imposed as long as the
agent acts within the scope of his authority, regardless of whether the corporation specifically
authorized or ratified the violation. See Gordan v. Burr, 506 F.2d 1080 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v.
Lur's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
50. Accountants could be found liable under rule lOb-5 if they certified a false financial
statement or if they failed to disclose that a statement, while true as to its included facts,
omitted material information. The courts neither required an intent to deceive investors nor
limited the action to plaintiffs in a special relationship with the accountants. This resulted in
broad liability for accountants who were merely negligent to plaintiffs with whom they had
no direct relationship. This most often occurred where an accountant could be charged with
negligently omitting material information from a prospectus which the plaintiff claimed would
have induced him to act differently had it been included in the prospectus. See Drake v. Thor
Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1967); Fisher v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y.
1967).
51. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 852-56 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 796 (1969).
52. Liability has been imposed to the extent of out of pocket expenses or benefit of
bargain depending upon the relationship of the parties and the egregiousness of the defendant's violation. Draconian damages, the benefit of the bargain for all parties who traded
in the particular security, whether they relied upon the misrepresentation or not, have not
been imposed. In all cases, however, the defendants are required to forfeit any profits they
may have made. Compare SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.) (where the
benefit of bargain rule was applied), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971) with Mitchell v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971) (where out of pocket damages was applied),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
53. Early cases held remote tippees to a negligence standard based upon the circumstances of each case. If the tippees knew or should have known of the nonpublic nature of
the information, they could be held liable in an action for damages. This standard looked to
such factors as the nature of the information received, the confidentiality of the source and
the likelihood that the source would have inside information, and the circumstances under
which the information was received. Materiality was also important in the sense that the
information was a factor in the decision to trade. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974). Materiality was often found, however, by the satisfaction of the Afliliated Ute test. All this test required for a finding of materiality was that the
information would be material in the sense that a reasonable investor might have considered
it important. This was an objective test which helped overcome the difficulty of showing
subjective materiality in a remote tippee's decision to trade. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972). See note 54 infra.
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restrictive than the elements of a common law action for fraud. 54 Initially the
courts required neither privity of contract nor scienter. 55 Because both privity
and scienter are usually difficult to prove in securities fraud, the federal action,
which did not require either, was far superior to action under common law5o
from the plaintiff's perspective.
The applicability of rule lOb-55s depends on the use of an instrumentality of
interstate commerce- s by the defendant to manipulate or deceive5 9 This element of action has not proved to be an obstacle with the expansion of the constitutional concept of interstate commerce.6 0 The language of the rule not only
prohibits the use of manipulative or deceptive devices in the interstate context, 61 but has been extended to cover negligently prepared financial state-

54. Several elements of action are required to be shown in an action against a nontrading
tipper. Foremost, there must be a trading tippee that violated §10b and rule lob-5 by an
illegal use of the tip. Second, the information must have been material inside information.
While it was possible that negligent tippiing could result in tipper liability in early cases,
today scienter would be required. See text accompanying note 106 infra. Nontrading tipper
cases today most often arise against brokers, and the requirement of scienter and the requisite knowledge of the nonpublic nature of the information makes this a difficult action.
See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 852-56 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 796 (1969).
See generally 2 S. GOLDBERG, supra note 8; M. BRODSKY, supra note 48, at 287.
55. See Kutner v. Kalish, 173 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1965). Florida recognized five
essential elements in common law fraud: misrepresentation of a material fact, scienter, intent
to induce action, justifiable reliance, and damages. Id. at 764-65. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF
TORTS, 686-97 (4th ed. 1971).
56. See text accompanying note 231 infra.
57. 15 U.S.C. §78bb(a) (1976). Section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that the federal remedies are only in the alternative and are not to be considered as
preempting any state action also available. State action is only precluded if it conflicts with
the federal provisions; it is allowed in all other instances, even where it will grant xelief unavailable under federal law. Cameron v. Outdoor Resorts of America, Inc., 608 F.2d 187, 196
(5th Cir. 1979) (assumed sub silentio). See also Note, Securities Fraud Under State Common
Law: Schein v. Chasen - Expanding Liability for the Tippor and Tippee, 45 U. COLO. L. REv.
519, 527 (1974); 2 S. GOLDBERG, supra note 8, §10.2 [b].
58. 15 U.S.C. §78j (1976); 17 C.F.R. 240.10b (1979). The use of any means of interstate
communication, including telephone has been held to support invocation of the federal law.
It is doubtful whether anything more than face to face communication could escape the provisions of rule lOb-5.
59. See note 41 supra. The attempt to manipulate or deceive can be either intentional or
negligent, and can be by misrepresentation or nondisclosure. The courts initially interpreted
this clause liberally in order to effect as wide relief as possible. Later decisions restricting the
use of federal law have centered on the elements of action necessary to establish an attempt to
manipulate or deceive. See text accompanying note 83 infra.
60. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, §8, cl.3. See, e.g., Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212 (1976);
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252-53 (1964); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301 (1964).
61. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1979). The language of the rule is fairly narrow, and certainly
narrower than the extensive application the rule was to experience in the hands of the
judiciary. It grew to become almost the omnibus provision for securities protection. This wide
expansion beyond the anticipation of the drafters of the rule was a primary factor motivating
the later judicially imposed restrictions.
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ments, 62 actions by agents, 3 and even aid given to those who violate the rule."
66
5
The extension of the rule to cover negligent conduct, while not universal,
was nonetheless significant in that the common law requirement of scienter was
frequently an insurmountable barrier to an action for securities fraud.
7
Privity of contract, another major obstacle to relief under common law," is
not an element of action under rule l0b-5.68 Where the common law required
the plaintiff to have traded directly with the defendant, the federal action does
not even require a contemporaneous trade,6 9 with some circuit courts allowing
action by a plaintiff who had not traded at all.70 These courts only required a
trade by either the defendant-' or a third party7 2 with whom the defendant was
62. Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1967); Fisher v. Kletz, 266
F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
63. See notes 47-50 supra.
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., SEC v. Management Dynamic Inc., 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975); Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Hochfelder v.
Midwest Stock Exchange, 503 F.2d 364, 374 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974); SEC v.
Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 541 (2d Cir. 1973); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co.,
286 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Ind. 1968), aff'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
989 (1970).
66. This split has been resolved by Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). See
note 89 and accompanying text, infra. During the early development of the rule, however, the
circuit courts were divided regarding the need for scienter in a private action for intentional
violations while others used the rule to encompass negligence as well. This uncertainty in the
law led to forum shopping, especially as applied to corporate officers and directors because the
courts that allowed action for negligent violations of the Act held corporate officers to the
higher standard of negligence rather than the business judgment rule used by some circuit
courts. See, e.g., Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 606 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 873 (1974); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), 404 U.S.
1004 (1971).
67. See text accompanying note 199 infra.
68. The early cases required only that a trade had been made and considered contact with
the defendant irrelevant. The absence of a privity requirement was a tremendous advantage in
a securities system where trades were made through brokers and specific connections between
buyer and seller often could not be made. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974);
Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971);
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 796 (1969).
69. See note 68 supra.
70. Compare Birubaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952) (where the
court required a plaintiff to have made a purchase or sale in order to have standing), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952) with Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 492 F.2d 136 (9th
Cir. 1973) (where the circuit court allowed a nontrading plaintiff to have standing), rezld,
421 U.S. 723 (1975). In both of these circuit court cases the plaintiff had not traded although
the defendant had. They illustrate the split in the circuit courts prior to the Supreme Court
intervention, in that one court allowed plaintiff to have standing, although he had not
traded, while the other court held the opposite. The permissive approach allowed a plaintiff
who refrained from trading in reliance on a misrepresentation to pursue redress under rule
lob-5. The restrictive circuits left this plaintiff without a federal remedy.
71. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), Bailes v.
Colonial Press, Inc., 444 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1971).
72. A trade by a third party can be enough to impose liability on a nontrading defendant if there is a close connection between the third party and the defendant. In addition
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connected. Even though some courts would not go this far, all jurisdictions allowed action by a plaintiff who traded, but could not show a contemporaneous
trade with the defendant. 73
The requirement of privity between the plaintiff and defendant was re7
placed with the elements of materiality4 and causality. 5 The information misrepresented or withheld was required to have been material,76 defined as inthe defendant must have influenced the third party to trade, and in doing so, must have
caused damage to the plaintiff. This is different from an agency or control person concept
since the third party need not have been in the defendant's employ or acting for his benefit.
All that is necessary is that the third party, connected by more than a causal relationship, be
influenced to trade by the defendant.
73. See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
956 (1952). Even under the most strict standing requirements of any circuit, those articulated
in Birnbaum, a plaintiff need not have traded contemporaneously with the defendant. Privity
of trade was replaced with the elements of materiality and causality. See notes 74 & 75 infra.
Otherwise the action would have been almost useless since it is often impossible to trace a
connection between parties to a trade through an exchange.
74. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). In what has become
known as the Affiliated Ute test, the Supreme Court defined materiality as being facts which
a reasonable investor might have considered important in making a decision. In Affiliated Ute
the action was for failure to disclose, but the test has since been applied both to nondisclosure
and misrepresentation. In practice, this test replaces privity with the requirement that the
plaintiff show the deception was concerned with reasonably important information. See also
List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965). In List the court used the language of materiality, but also looked at the causal link between the violation and the damages.
The plaintiff could not show that he would have acted any differently had there been full
disclosure, therefore, the court denied relief. The court wanted a showing that in effect the
deception caused plaintiff's damages. If the plaintiff cannot show that his actions would have
changed, in follows that the deception was not responsible for his damages, he would have
suffered them in any event. Accord, Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
Often cases use a synthesis of both tests and require that the information misrepresented
or undisclosed must be reasonably important and that the plaintiff would have acted differently had full disclosure been made. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
75. If the plaintiff is a corporation and the action is in the nature of a derivative suit,
the causality requirement consists of the necessity to show damage to the corporate entity.
This is separate from damage to the shareholders. It is not enough that the shareholders lost
money; the corporation itself must have been damaged in order for a derivative suit to be
brought. See Polakoff v. The Delaware Steeplechase & Race Ass'n, 254 F. Supp. 574 (D.C.
Del. 1966); Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213 (S.D. N.Y. 1965). Once the element of damage
to the corporation is shown, security for expenses is not a requirement for a derivative action
for violation of rule 10b-5. McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 939 (1961). But see Schein v. Chasen, 313 So. 2d 739, 746 (Fla. 1975) (the Florida
supreme court followed the federal rule and required that damage to the corporation be
shown as a prerequisite to a derivativesuit).
76. In case of misrepresentation, reliance and materiality are separate issues. If the defendant misrepresented a fact to the plaintiff, the plaintiff must show reliance on the misrepresentation. This is not true, however, of cases of nondisclosure. If the violation is one of
failure to disclose, the materiality and reliance elements are combined. If the information
withheld is found to have been material, there is a presumption that the plaintiff would have
relied on it had it been disclosed. This rule recognizes that the only way a plaintiff in a nondisclosure case could show reliance would be to show that the information withheld was important enough to support the inference that it would have changed his actions. See Affiliated
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77
formation which would be of importance to a reasonably speculative investor.
Once the plaintiff had shown materiality, he then had to establish a causal link
between the information and the damage alleged. If the violation was one of

misrepresentation the plaintiff had to show reliance on the erroneous information,78 and if the violation was one of nondisclosure, he had to convince the
court that he would have acted differently had the omitted information been
9

disclosed7
Because elements of action under rule lOb-5 did not require privity of contract or scienter on the part of the defendant, the federal action often applied
where the common law would not support relief. 80 The federal action was

limited however, by the requirements of the use of an interstate instrumentality,
the completion of a trade by the defendant, and informational causality and
materiality.8 1 These limits were flexible enough to allow a substantial expansion of rule lOb-5 beyond what the legislature had envisioned.82
Recent cases have severely restricted the initial expansiveness of rule lOb-5
and have wide application to securities regulation. 83 Some aspects of privity, 4
scienter, and a relationship between plaintiff and defendant have been added
to the elements of action, making the plaintiff's burden heavier than initially
imposed by early judicial interpretations. 85 The net result has often been to
Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1978); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, &
Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974). Cf. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90
(10th Cir.) (where, in a case of misrepresentation, the separate issue of reliance had to be
addressed by plaintiff), cert. denied, 44 U. S. 1004 (1971).
77. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
78. See note 76 supra.
79. Id.
80. Without this liberalization, an action under the Act would be no more advantageous
in most respects than an action under common law. See Note, supra note 23, at 1094; Comment, supra note 47, at 863.
81. See notes 74 & 75 supra.
82. The legislative intent behind the Act was to curb knowing misuse of inside information by insiders who themselves traded. See Repbrt to the Secretary of Commerce of the Committee on Stock Exchange Regulation, S. REP. 792 73rd CONG., 2nd Sass. 18 (1934). The use of
the act by the judiciary quickly encompassed more than just knowing violations by traders.
For an exposition of the flexible policy applied by the courts, see Superintendent of Ins. v.
Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
83. The circuit courts expanded the use of the Act until the Supreme Court reacted and
reimposed restrictions in the form of adding elements of action formerly not required by the
circuit courts. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), the Court
stated that rule lob-5 bore a relationship to misrepresentation and deceit in tort law. Id. at
744-45. The Court further stated that because the action had departed from its tort background the best way to limit its growth was to reimpose elements of tort action. Id. See generally Note, The Reach of the S.E.C. Under Rule 10b-5 Is FurtherRestricted: Negligent Conduct Is Insufficient to Warrant Commission InstigatedInjunctive Relief, 31 U. MIAMr L. REv.
1524 (1977).
84. Privity per se, a traceable, face to face trade between plaintiff and defendant, is still
not required under rule lOb-5. A semi-privity requirement has been established, where the
plaintiff must show his involvement in a trade even if he cannot trace it to the defendant.
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731 (1975).
85. Compare Cameron v. Outdoor Resorts of America Inc., 608 F.2d 187, 194 (5th Cir.
1979) (where the new elements of action denied the plaintiff a cause of action under the Act)
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deny plaintiffs a federal cause of action through an inability of the plaintiffs to
87
meet the elements of action" 6 and to force them to seek relief under state law.
While the courts do not require privity per se, the class of potential plaintiffs has been greatly reduced by the imposition of some of the elements of
privity s s In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores8 9 the Supreme Court held
that a plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller in order to have standing.90 In
Blue Chip Stamps the plaintiff had not made a purchase or sale, but was
damaged by his failure to act. 91 In denying relief, the Supreme Court admitted
that its decision prevented three classes of plaintiffs from obtaining relief under
rule lOb-5. 92 Potential purchasers who had been dissuaded from purchasing by
9 4
the misrepresentation, 93 actual shareholders who did not sell, and parties

whose interests were devalued, 95 all are now foreclosed from action under rule
lOb-5 even though their damages result from violations of the rule. The Court
recognized this, but felt justified by the need to restrict the heretofore unchecked growth of the rule. 91
Other elements of privity have been imposed by later decisions in cases of
nondisclosure. These cases hold that while privity is not necessary in instances
with Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 235 (2d Cir. 1974)
(the plaintiff was granted relief under the more relaxed elements of action previously used for
the Act).
86. 608 F.2d at 194.
87. Id. at 196.
88. The Supreme Court decision imposing some of the elements of privity was a case of
misrepresentation, not nondisclosure. This principle has recently been applied by a circuit court
to nondisclosure, restricting action in that case to an even greater degree than in misrepresentation. Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 312 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
The court held there was no duty to disclose absent a trade between the plaintiff and defendant. Id. The court took a very restrictive stand, finding that even a trade between the
plaintiff and a third party would not support liability, but required an actual plaintiffdefendant connection. Id. See text accompanying notes 76-79 supra.
89. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
90. Id. at 731.
91. Id. at 730. The plaintiff had a right to buy the defendant's stock, but passed up the
opportunity based on the very negative picture the defendant presented in its prospectus. Id.
When later it was discovered that the prospectus contained misrepresentations and that the
stock had been offered at a very good price, the plaintiff brought action under the Act. Because the plaintiff had not traded, however, he was denied standing even though the defendant was guilty of misrepresentation in its prospectus. Id. at 731.
92. Id. This was a xeaffirmation of the doctrine found in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.,
193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). This doctrine required a plaintiff to
be either a purchaser or seller in order to have standing under the Act. An exception to this
rule has always been allowed where the plaintiff seeks injunctive relief rather than damages.
See, e.g., Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
93. 421 U.S. at 748.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 731. The Court was also concerned about plaintiff abuse of rule lob-5 in
"strike suits." There was a very real danger that the lenient elements of action under the Act
and the liberal discovery procedures were being used to extract settlements from corporations
in cases of doubtful merit. The corporations were settling just to protect themselves from exposure of business documents. This and other abuses of rule lob-5 by plaintiffs comprised
part of the motivation for the court to restrict the rule.
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of misrepresentation,97 when the misrepresentation is only a failure to disclose,
the plaintiff must show a relationship to the defendant that imposes a duty to
disclose.98 The recent case of Chiarellav. United States,99 however, held that
absent a fiduciary relationship between the parties, 100 a purchaser has no duty
to disclose to a seller. 10 1 The defendant in Chiarella was a corporate outsider
who traded on the basis of inside information which he did not disclose to the
parties with whom he dealt. 0 2 Prior judicial use of rule lOb-5 would have allowed action in this case, but the Supreme Court denied relief, finding the
necessary fiduciary relationship was not present. 0 3 By denying relief, this decision has precluded action against many tippees and nontrading tippers in the
ordinary course of exchange transactions. 04
Scienter, the intent of the defendant, 0 5 has been reimposed to an even
greater degree than privity, and the courts have departed from early cases allowing action for negligent conduct. 08 In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,T7 an
action for negligent violation of rule lOb-5, the Supreme Court held that
scienter was an essential element of action under the rule. 08 This decision has
97. See note 93 supra.
98. Flight Equip. & Eng'r Corp. v. Shelton, 103 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1958). Traditionally, a
duty to disclose has been supported by the relationship of an officer or director to the corporate
shareholders. Id. at 626. It has also been found where the parties are not at an arm's length,
one has a great advantage over the other, and acts egregiously. Vokes v. Arthur Murray Inc.,
212 So. 2d 906, 908-09 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1968).
99. 100 S. Ct. 1108 (1980).
100. The defendant was a printer who used information gathered from printing corporate
documents to trade in securities. He had no relationship with the stockholders of the corporation and was working for an independent contractor. Id. at 1112.
101. Id. at 1115.
102. Id. at 1112.
103. Cf. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.) (where purchasers made
some of their trades on the basis of nondisclosure), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971). In
Texas Gulf Sulphur, although the defendants did later misrepresent, early violations were
nondisclosures. While a fiduciary relationship could be established with the defendants who
were directors, other defendants did not hold positions traditionally thought to be fiduciary in
character. Under the Texas Gulf Sulphur analysis, the facts of Chiarella would have probably
supported liability because that analysis did not require a fiduciary relationship and the facts
included knowing abuse of obviously inside information. 100 S. Ct. at 1112.
104. Because most tippees are outside the corporation, they hold no fiduciary duty to the
shareholders and after Chiarella, can trade without fear of civil liability to the defrauded
parties. If their nontrading tippers can be ascertained, they might be subject to liability, but
the problems of proof and the other restrictive elements of atcion make this unlikely. See 100
S. Ct. at 1117.
105. See note 80 supra.
106. Prior to the Supreme Court settling the law in this area the lower courts were split
and in confusion over the ability of negligence to support liability under the Act. See Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 606 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974).
Even the courts that allowed negligence to support liability were uncomfortable with ordinary
negligence and tended to impose liability only where more than mere negligence was found.
Id.

107. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
108. The Court required scienter, but only addressed the situation where a plaintiff
sought relief in a private action for damages. The Court left unanswered the standard to be
applied in SEC actions or an action for injunctive relief. The Court also specifically did not
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created serious difficulties for the plaintiff,10 9 especially in an action against
corporate insiders or traders whom the plaintiff has never met.110 Corporate mismanagement"' and breach of fiduciary duty,"? earlier actionable, are now beyond the scope of rule 10b-5 unless intentional fraud can be shown." 3 If the
defendant is insulated from the plaintiff by third parties, scienter becomes even
5
more of a barrier. Defendants such as controlling persons, 1 4 remote tippees,"
nontrading tippers, 116 and aiders"17 may now claim their acts were merely
negligent and defy plaintiffs to show otherwise.""
The reimposition of the elements of scienter and a form of privity have precluded many potential plaintiffs from bringing actions under federal law." 9
address the question regarding reckless conduct. At this time, the ability of reckless conduct,
short of scienter, to support an action for damages remains unsettled. It is probable that the
circuit courts will remain split on this issue, with the more plaintiff minded circuits using it
as an avenue to grant relief. Id. at 193 n.12. See also Note, supra note 83.
109. 425 U.S. at 188-90. The plaintiffs suffered damages as the result of the negligence of
the accounting firm that performed the corporation's audits. The plaintiffs won in the lower
courts which applied the old standard, allowing an action for negligent conduct. Id. at 191.
The SEC argued that this standard was proper since the effect of the securities violation on
the plaintiff was the same whether the violation was negligent or intentional. Id. at 198. The
Supreme Court rejected this argument and required scienter. Id. at 199. The court interpreted
the history of rule 10b-5 as being nonexpansive. They, in effect, reversed the earlier judicial
trend of expansion under the Act and set a more restrictive attitude of statutory construction.
Id. at 201.
110. See Comment, supra note 47, at 863 (1978). See also Note, supra note 23, at 1095. The
difficulty of proving intent in the corporate setting, which was necessary under common law
fraud, was one of the gross defects in state law that led to the enactment of the Act. Id.
Ill. The business judgment rule will insulate officers and directors from the proof of
intentional mismanagement unless evidence to the contrary is overwhelming. See Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
112. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc., v. Green, 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), ret'd, 430 U.S. 462
(1977). In the Green case there was no manipulation or deception, only a breach of fiduciary
duty. Using the old standard, the lower court gave relief under the Act, but was reversed by
the Supreme Court.
113. See Campbell, Elements of Recovery Under Rule 10b-5: Scienter, Reliance, and
Plaintiff's Reasonable Conduct Requirement, 26 S.C. L. REv. 653, 653-74 (1975). Under the
present state of the law, the plaintiff must show scienter, reliance, materiality and damage
just as in common law fraud. In addition, he must show justifiable reliance and that he
acted reasonably in his reliance on the misrepresentation. Id. at 674 n.100.
114. See note 49 supra.
115. See note 53 and accompanying text, supra.
116. See note 47 supra.
117. An action against an aider is an action under the Act, yet common law principles
have been grafted on to make the action more difficult than one against a principal. There
are two elements of action against an aider that are unique. The aider must have knowledge
of the wrongfulness of the principal's action and must then render substantial assistance. See
Woodward v. Metro. Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th Cir. 1975). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF ToRTs §876 (1965); Note, Rule of lOb-5: Liability for Aiding and Abetting After
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 999, 1004 (1976).
118. See, e.g., Cameron v. Outdoor Resorts of America, Inc., 608 F.2d 187, 194 (1979). The
defense of negligence is even more effective when conducted from behind the corporate shield.
See note 110 supra.
119. The Supreme Court recognized this, but reasoned that the loss in effectiveness of the
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The plaintiff must show scienter and then establish the fact that he traded, and
in cases of nondisclosure, he must go farther and establish a fiduciary relationship to the defendant. The result is that instead of being able to use federal law
tailored for securities violations, plaintiffs now are often forced to seek al20
ternate remedies under state law.'

AcrION UNDER

FLORmA'S BLUE SKY LAw

If a plaintiff is precluded from bringing federal action for securities fraud,

relief must then come from either common law or state statutory provisions.
Called "blue sky laws,' 1 21 state statutory provisions regulating securities transactions are so pervasive that they are the next logical source of relief122 The

Florida securities statutes are wider in scope than the federal law which was
enacted solely to ensure full disclosure. Florida's law, in addition to anti-fraud
provisions, has merit provisions1 23 which allow the state to judge the relative
financial merit of the security and to use that judgment as a criterion for disqualification. 124 The plaintiff should be aware that the policy underlying the
Florida statute is not only to mandate full disclosure, but also to prevent unfair practices in general, even if there is full disclosure.25 The policy behind
Act is worth the restrictions set on it in furtherence of proper statutory interpretation. See
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731 (1975).
120. See, e.g., Cameron v. Outdoor Resorts of America Inc., 608 F.2d 187, 196 (1979).
121. See 1 L. Loss, SEcuRrmS REGULATION 27 (2d ed. 1961). "Blue Sky Laws" is the name
given to state statutes which regulate securities matters within the state. These acts fall into
three general types: anti-fraud, broker registration and securities registration. The anti-fraud
types are aimed at preventing fraudulent sales or purchases of securities and are generally
similar to rule lOb-5. Id. at 33. The broker and securities' registration types register brokers
and securities respectively, but may not have anti-fraud provisions as such. Id. Florida has
elements of all three types and cannot be categorized as any, but is an amalgam. Id. at 42-43.
See also H. BLOOMENTHAL & S. WING, SEcurrIEs LAW ch. 9 at 3-4 (1973).
122. Florida's provisions very closely parallel the Act in the anti-fraud sections. FLA. STAT.
§517.301(1)(b) (1979). The Florida anti-fraud section makes it unlawful "to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud." Id. This is a reflection of the legislative intent to allow
relief under Florida law for fraud in the sale of securities. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
UNIFORM STATE LAw, HANDBOOK AND PROCEDINGS 17 (1929). Florida adopted the 1929 Uniform
Securities Act, 1931 Fla. Laws ch. 14899, §22.
123. FLA. STAT. §517.07 (1979). Merit provisions are provisions allowing the state government to pass on the financial merits of the security. Florida requires this before the security
can be offered for sale within the state. This is more stringent than the federal law which
makes no such judgment, but only requires disclosure of the data behind an offering. The
basic intent of Florida's merit provision, to be a prophylactic and prevent high risk securities
from entering the market. See Data Lease Financial Corp. v. Barad, 291 So. 2d 608, 612 (Fla.
1974). See generally Goodkind, Blue Sky Law: Is There Merit In The Merit Requirement, 76
Wis. L. REv.79 (1976).
124. FLA. STAT. §517.07 (1979).
125. The intent of the federal law was to establish full disclosure in securities transactions.
See note 27 and accompanying text, supra. Florida's policy subsumes this in the overall goal of
protection of investors. Florida's provisions will apply whether there is full disclosure or not
as long as there is a basic unfairness to the transaction. See Data Lease Financial Corp. v.
Barad, 291 So. 2d 608, 612 (Fla. 1974). This policy encourages a more liberal judicial application of Florida's provisions on a parallel with the federal courts and rule lob-5.
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the Florida provisions is more liberal than that behind the Securities Act of
6
1934 and supports a more liberal relief for fraudulent actions.12

While Florida did not adopt the Uniform Securities Act of 1956,127 the two
29
128
most notably concerning fraud.1
schemes are similar in several respects,
Both Florida and the Uniform Act follow rule lOb-5s 0 and prohibit fraudulent
s
practices in conjunction with the sale or purchase of securities." It is signif-

icant that, although similar to rule lOb-5, the Florida anti-fraud provisions
have not been subjected to a similar restrictive interpretation by state courts."32
Recent action has been expansive, as exemplified by the 1978 amendment of
13
section 517.211 to allow action by defrauded sellers as well as purchasers.
126. Id. This liberal policy is further evidenced by the use of the Florida statutes to
supplement rather than exclude common law actions. FLA. STAT. §517.241(2) (1979). This
section not only allows a statutory right of action under the Florida Blue Sky Law, but
statutorily articulates the policy that statutory relief is in addition to common law and does
not abrogate any existing rights. Id. See 2 L. Loss, supra note 121, at 1123-32.
127. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSION ON UNIFORM STATE LAw, HANDBOOK AND
PROCEEDINGS 134-35 (1956). The Uniform Securities Act of 1956 included an anti-fraud provision patterned somewhat after rule lOb-5. Id. at 183. The anti-fraud provisions made it
unlawful to engage in an act or course of business which would result in a fraud. Id. at 182.
See also Uniform Securities Act §§101(3), 410(a).
128. See Uniform Securities Act §410(a). This section of the act creates a statutory right
of civil action against a seller who perpetrates a fraud. The effect of this section is limited
however, by following subparagraphs which limit civil action to action against a buyer. Id.
§401(h). This leaves a fraudulent buyer covered only by §101 of the act which does not provide for civil damages. Id. § 10 1(3). A fraudulent buyer, therefore is not under the reach of the
portions of the civil penalties of the act and can only be sanctioned by other state provisions

such as common law or by criminal action. See L. Loss,
SECURITIES ACT, 151 (1976).

COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM

Florida has not adopted the Uniform Securities Act, choosing instead provisions for civil
relief that are more liberal. FLA. STAT. §517.211(2) (1979). This section was amended in 1978
to allow action against both a purchaser or seller, removing one of the biggest statuatory
deficiencies. 1978 Fla. Laws ch. 78-435. In addition, this section allows a private right of damages which had to be judicially imposed under rule lOb-5. FIA. STAT. §517.211(2) (1979). This
concrete expression of the legislature's intent to allow liberal relief gives less room for judicial
restriction than under the federal act.
129. Compare Uniform Securities Act §410 (allowing action only against a fraudulent
seller) with FLA. STAT. 517.211(2) (1979) (which allows action against both a fraudulent seller
and buyer).
130. See FA. STAT. §517.211 (1979); Uniform Securities Act, §§101,410; 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5
(1979). Florida's provisions more closely parallel the language of rule lob-5 than does the
Uniform Securities Act. All three make deception in the sale of securities actionable, but only
rule lOb-5 and Florida's provisions give a cause of action to both defrauded sellers and purchasers. See generally Goodkind, supra note 123, at 79 n.2; Ratner, supra note 2, at 951.
131. Only Florida gives a private right of damages to both a seller and a purchaser. The
Uniform Securities Act forces a seller to rely on either common law or criminal action. See
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946); Loss, supra note 143, at 151.
See also H. SowARDs & N. HIRSCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, BLUE SKY REGULATIONS ch. 6 at 52
(1979).
132. See notes 88-106 and accompanying text, supra.
133. See note 128 supra. Although the legislature acted to alleviate some deficiencies of
the Florida law, faults still exist. The largest of these, procedurally, is the lack of jurisdiction
over many potential defendants. This is inherent in state blue sky laws because they are limited
to the reach of their long arm statutes. Often the defendants have had less than the minimum
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This amendment eliminated what had been a major fault in Florida's statutes,

and illustrates the legislature's intent to expand this area. This intent is also
illustrated by the legislature's retention of common law actions as an alternative
to the statute. 34 The liberal policy of fair practice in security transactions and

the expansive attitude of the legislature support the view that the Florida blue
sky laws augment the common law and seek to provide investors with additional protection.
Florida's blue sky laws avoid the restrictions of scienter found in both common law fraud and rule 10b-5,135 and remain a viable action against de-

fendants protected from proof of intent such as corporate insiders or remote
tippees. 38 The Florida blue sky provisions offer the plaintiff an excellent alternative when action under rule 101>5 is precluded by a lack of scienter, but

the plaintiff must remain aware of elements of action which are peculiar to the
Florida statute.
Florida's law is, on its face, more conducive to private action than rule
1b-5.137 While the private remedy under federal law is a creation of the

judiciary, the private right of action in Florida law is based on a statutory
mandate. 38 Although based on a statutory rather than a judicial base, the

contact required in order to gain jurisdiction, forcing the plaintiff to litigate in a foreign
forum. See Bartell, supra note 20, at 463 n.32. Substantively, the most critical defect remaining
in the Florida law is the privity requirement. See note 182 and accompanying text, infra.
This defect should be corrected to conform to the liberal policy behind the statutes.
134. FLA. STAT. §517.211(2) (1979). Florida's blue sky law follows rule lOb-5 and does not
preclude common law action, but allows it as both alternative and supplement. See also 15
U.S.C. §78bb(a) (1976); Note, supra note 62, at 523.
135. See note 108 supra. Originally, Florida's law followed rule lOb-5 which permitted, at
least according to many circuit courts, action for negligent violation. See text accompanying
note 117 supra. Recent Supreme Court decisions have restricted rule lOb-5, while Florida's
law remained consistent with earlier federal liberality.
136. See FLA. STAT. §517.301(1) (1979). The language of this section has two very expansive
clauses. It is introduced by making unlawful any action done "in connection with" a sale or
purchase of a security, and ends with an inclusion of both direct and indirect violations. Id.
Cf. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1979) (where the same clauses are used). This language, especially the
"in connection with" phrase, is the language used expansively by the federal courts in applying
rule lOb-5. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 796 (1970). The language, used in Florida's statute, although similar to rule lOb-5, would

be unaffected by the recent cases restricting rule lOb-5 and could easily cover nontrading
tippers and xemote tippees in the same manner as early federal cases.
137. Compare 15 U.S.C. §78a (1976) (which leaves the question of the right to a private
action unanswered) with FLA. STAT. §517.211(1) (1979) (which statutorily grants the right).
Similarly, the type of damages authorized is statutorily implied in Florida, while it had to be
judicially imposed on the federal law. Id. Punitive damages are not generally awarded in
either, and both allow for xecission. Monetary damages are out of pocket and not benefit of
bargain. The defendant usually receives the difference of what he could replace the security
for had he acted within a reasonable time. See Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d
90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971). One advantage of action under Florida's law
is the statutory provision of attorney's fees in addition to the judgment, a provision not
present under rule lOb-5. FLA. STAT. §517.211(6) (1979). This is in keeping with the protective
policy of the blue sky law and will allow investors with small claims to afford to bring action.
138. FLA. STAT. §517.211(2) (1979).
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Florida law followed the federal law in its expansive phase.13 9 As the federal
law expanded to include tippers and remote tippees, the Florida law, by its
prohibition of indirect attempts to violate the statute, also included defendants
other than trading insiders. 14o Similar to rule lOb-5, the Florida law would
apply to aiders and abettors, controlling persons and tippees.141 While the
Florida statutory law mirrors the earlier expansive judicial interpretation of
the federal law, it has not yet changed direction and followed the recent judicially imposed restrictions of the federal law.' 4 2 Accordingly, the only re-

strictions on the Florida law are those statutorily imposed by its own elements
of action 14 3 and it is more immune from judicial restriction than was rule
lOb-5. In addition, only a broad interpretation of the restrictions that are imposed on Florida's law will effectuate the liberal legislative intent to insure
fairness in securities transactions.'4
Section 517.211 of the Florida statutes145 is an example of restrictions placed
on the blue sky law which are more broadly interpreted than comparable federal law.

46

Section 517.211 gives a cause of action to a purchaser or seller

47

and

the Florida courts have interpreted this similarly to the federal decision in
Blue Chip Stamps,148 by requiring a plaintiff to be either a purchaser or seller
to have standing. Within these limits, the Florida courts have acted more ex139. See note 130 and accompanying text, supra. The language of the Florida anti-fraud
provisions followed rule lOb-5. The federal cases provided analagous precedent for any elements not codified by state law because the language of the federal and state statutes closely
resembled each other. The precedential value of federal law and its statutory similarity was
tacitly recognized in Florida's blue sky law by a provision which approved federal civil
remedies. FLA. STAT. §517.241(3) (1979). This provision authorizes remedies developed under
federal law to be brought in state court. This section is, in effect, a codification of federal law
as an addition to state law. It is another example of the expansive intent of the Florida statute
because federal law, added to state law in this manner, insures that the state provision will
always protect investors to the limit of federal development. At this time, the state law is
broader than the federal, but when the statute was drafted, the federal was still in its expansive
phase.
140. FLA. STAT. §517.301(l) (1979).
141. See notes 50 and 136 supra. This comparison applies to earlier actions under rule
lOb-5. Now, after the restriction of rule lob-5 actions, state law is actually better against these
parties than action under the Act.
142. See note 119 and accompanying text, supra.
143. See notes 169 and 177 infra.
144. This intent is to provide protection, not just disclosure, for investors in Florida. See
Data Lease Financial Corp. v. Barad, 291 So. 2d 608, 612 (Fla. 1974). See also 1931 Fla. Laws
ch. 14899, §22.
145. FLA. STAT. §517.211 (1979). This section authorizes the remedies available for the
anti-fraud provisions. See FLA. STAT. §517.301 (1979). It restricts the blue sky law in the sense
that remedies are allowed only under its provisions. If the plaintiff cannot comply, he is
forced to rely on the common law.
146. The purchase and sale requirement, which is comparable to §517.211 has been
interpreted strictly in the federal law. See 421 U.S. at 731.
147. FLA. STAT. §517.211(2) (1979). The statute provides that violators shall be liable "to
the person selling the security to or purchasing the security from such person ..
" This
language mandates the purchase or sale requirement that was judicially imposed on rule
lob-5, following the trend of the Florida legislature to codify federal case law.
148. See 421 U.S. at 731. See text accompanying note 88 supra.
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pansively than their federal counterparts and will allow action for a violation
of the statute even absent a trade by the defendant1 49 In Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith v. Byrne, 5s the Florida Third District Court of Appeal held
a broker liable for accepting a client's stop order at a time when stop orders in
the security could not be placed.151 The plaintiff had standing because he had
made a trade and the court went on to hold the broker liable under section
517.301(b) even though he was not a purchaser or seller himself.152 This result
would not have been possible under rule 10b-5.15 3
MerrillLynch v. Byrne'5" illustrates another advantage of Florida's blue sky
law, the absence of the scienter requirement' 55 which is now an element of an
action under rule lOb-5 after Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.56 The court in
MerrillLynch v. Byrne 57 held that while scienter is an element of action under
Florida's common law of fraud, 58 it is not required for liability under the
statute.'5 9 This only applies to an action against a principal l o0 however, and
Florida still requires scienter for persons other than the principal, such as aiders
and abettors.16 1 Under this analysis, corporations are considered principals and
149. See FLA. STAT. §517.211(2) (1979). The statute speaks in terms of liability being imposed upon fraudulent purchasers or sellers, but the courts have implied an action against
mere violators who have not sold. This expansion under the act was done implicitly; the
courts glossed over this issue and assumed that §517.211 allowed action against violators as
well as traders. See note 167 infra.
150. 820 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1975).
151. Id. at 437-38. The broker agreed to enter the plaintiff's stop orders but failed to
check the computer which would have informed him that stop orders could no longer be
placed on that security. The plaintiff brought action for a negligent violation of §517.301(b).
Id. at 440.
152. Id. The broker never made a purchase or sale; he merely negligently assisted the
plaintiff in making one.
153. See note 72 supra. Action under rule 10b-5 required either a trade by the defendant, a third party influenced by the defendant, or that the action be against an aider and
abettor. In Merrill v. Byrne the defendant was neither a trader not an aider and abettor, and
so would have been immune from federal action. In the state action the broker was held
liable as a principal, not an aider, and was held liable even though he had neither traded
nor influenced another to do so in his place. 820 So. 2d at 487-88.
154. 820 So. 2d at 440.
155. Id. The court held that while scienter may be a requirement for common law fraud,
it is not necessary for recovery under Florida's blue sky law. Id. It is significant that the
Florida court relied on several federal decisions to interpret Florida's security law. Id. This
illustrates the Florida tendency to follow federal law when it is expansively interpreted.
156. 425 U.S. at 193. See text accompanying note 120 supra.
157. 820 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1975).
158. Id. at 440.
159. Id. The requirement of scienter is also not a necessity for actions prosecuted by the
state. See State v. Houghtaling, 181 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 1965).
160. 820 So. 2d at 487. In this case the defendants were all principals who participated
personally in the violations. See also State v. Houghtaling, 181 So. 2d 636, 687 (Fla. 1965).
161. See Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975). Plaintiff brought
action against defendant bank for aiding and abetting a violation of the Florida blue sky law.
Id. 87-88. The court denied liability because of the lack of scienter on the part of the aider,
even though the principal could have been held liable for mere negligence. Id. at 97. The
holding required scienter on the part of the aider if the aiders activity constituted no more
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are held liable without scienter for the acts of their agents. 162 Corporate officers
and directors are not considered principals when acting for the corporation, and
cannot be held liable for negligent violations of the blue sky law.' 6' The plaintiff in Florida must be satisfied with an action against the corporate entity un8
less scienter can be shown in which case the individual agents can be liable. 4
Except for defendants other than principals, the Florida blue sky law remains
more liberal than action under rule 1Ob-5. Scienter is only necessary in an action
against aiders and abettors, corporate officers and other secondary parties, unlike rule 1Ob-5 where it is required in all cases. 165
While the Florida law is more liberal than the federal law in its requirements for scienter, Florida law is more restrictive regarding privity. The federal cases have added some aspects of privity to the action under rule lOb-5, but
as yet have not required privity per se.166 A survey of Florida cases shows that
liability has been imposed under Florida blue sky law only where there was a
face to face transaction between the plaintiff and defendant.' 67 Although it is
true that Florida law will support liability where the defendant has not actually
than its regular practices. In addition, the court required a violation by the principal and
knowing assistance by an aider who was generally aware of his role. Id.
162. See Hudak v. Economic Research Analysts, Inc., 499 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975). The corporate entity is as vulnerable as an individual in this
context and can be held liable for the negligent securities violations of its officers and directors.
Id. at 1002. This is because the corporation is seen as being able to act only through its agents.
This case is also significant because the plaintiff brought action under rule lOb-5, but the
court was forced to apply Florida's blue sky law to determine the applicable statute of
limitations. Id. at 999. The court applied Florida blue sky law, recognizing that it was a
mirror of rule lob-5. Id. at 1000. But see Connely v. Special Road & Bridge Dist. No. 5, 99
Fla. 456, 126 So. 794 (Fla. 1930). Here the court applied agency law to disallow the imputation of an agent's criminal act to the principal on the theory that the agent's authority did
not contemplate illegal activity. Id. at 473-74, 126 So. at 800.
163. Hudak v. Economic Research Analysts, Inc., 499 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975). The imputation of negligence does not flow in both directions.
While the corporation can be held for negligent acts of its officers and directors, they, as individuals, can only be held liable for violations with scienter. Id. at 1002. Thus an individual,
who could normally be liable for a negligent violation of the statute, will have immunity
because he was acting in the name of a corporation. This is in keeping with the common
law business judgment rule which does not impose liability on directors or officers for negligent conduct that is arguably within their sound business judgment.
164. Id. If the officers or directors of a corporation act with scienter, then they can be
liable as individuals and are not shielded by the corporate veil.
165. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
166. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731 (1975); Fridrich v.
Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
167. See Schein v. Chasen, 313 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1975). Schein illustrates the connection
between most Florida blue sky cases. The defendants were investors and a broker which had
no face to face contact with the plaintiff shareholders. Although other factors were given as
supporting the decision denying liability, it is significant that privity was lacking. Id. at 744.
Accord, Hudak v. Economic Research Analysts, Inc., 499 F.2d 996, 1002 (5th Cir. 1974);
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Byrne, 320 So. 2d 436, 437-38 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1975).
In both of these cases, liability conformed to the absence or presence of face to face transactions between the plaintiff and defendant. See generally Comment, Corporations: Florida
Common Law Liability of Tippees In a Shareholder Derivative Suit, 28 U. FLA. L. REv. 223,
224-35 (1975).
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traded, and has merely violated the statute, 86 the cases that have done so have
all had the element of face to face contact between plaintiff and defendant6 9
The strict requirement of privity has been one of the major faults of most
blue sky laws including Florida's, and the resultant inability to afford a remedy
when a transaction is consummated through an exchange was one of the
motivating factors for enactment of the Securities Act of 1934.170 This debility

caused by the element of privity could be overcome by the liberal trend of
Florida courts. 171 Not only does the language of section 517.301(1)72 closely
parallel rule lOb-5, but section 517.301(3)173 specifically imposes liability for
knowingly making a false or fictitious statement. The similarity of section
517.301(1) to rule lOb-5 and the trend of Florida courts to interpret the blue
sky law expansively could result in Florida adopting the federal elements of
materiality and causality in lieu of privity7 4 This is further supported by
section 517.301(3), which imposes liability for intentional deception. This provision, interpreted in the light of Merrill Lynch v. Byrnel75 which imposed

liability on a nontrading defendant, would argue for the adoption of privity
requirements similar to federal law. If so, it is also likely that Florida courts,
168. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Byrne, 320 So. 2d 436, 437-38 (Fla. 3d
D.C.A. 1975). See note 149 supra.
169. See, e.g., Data Lease Financial Corp. v. Barad, 291 So. 2d 608, 613 (Fla. 1974). See
note 167 supra.
170. Privity is the main problem with both common law and blue sky actions and has
been so since the inception of securities exchanges. The face to face contact necessary under
Florida's provisions is totally lacking in the normal broker consummated transaction where
not only are the parties without contact, they are completely unknown and often untraceable.
This remains the one great advantage of action under rule lOb-5, the ability to pierce the
veil of the exchange and impose liability without strict privity. The best solution for this
problem would be either judicial expansion of Florida's blue sky law or legislation to
abrogate the privity requirement. It would be within the general liberal intent of the statute
to expand Florida's law to a more complete mirror of rule lOb-5. An argument could be
made from §517.241(3) which provides federal civil remedies for Florida investors. This section could be used for support that the state law was intended to be at least as expansive as
the federal, relaxing the privity requirement. See FLA. STAT. §517.241(3) (1979). See also
Ratner, supranote 2, at 947-48.
171. See note 170 supra.
172. FLA. STAT. §517.301(l) (1979). This section, similarly to rule 10b-5, sanctions violations in connection with the sale or purchase of a security, directly or indirectly, and further
specifically enumerates device, schemes or artifices to defraud. It further follows rule lOb-5
by making illegal any course of business that would operate as a fraud or deceit. Id.
173. Id. §517.301(3) (1979). This statute specifically makes intentional deception actionable. The strong legislative intent, evinced by reiterating conduct already covered by a
previous statute, argues for an abrogation of the privity requirement in order to effectuate its
provisions. It can also be argued that action under this section is not tied to a relationship
but to an act, intentional deception in a securities transaction. Violations under this section
should therefore be sanctioned because of their nature and not become immune because of a
technicality of relationship.
174. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
175. 320 So. 2d 436, 440 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1975). The court was willing to read beyond the
language of the statute to provide relief. This judicial favor for the statute could just as
easily allow the privity requirement to be circumvented. The privity requirement is not
required by the language of §517 and is as easily subject to judicial expansion as were the
principles in MerrillLynch v. Byrne.
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following the federal trend, would impose liability without privity in circumstances of misrepresentation, but would not impose liability for failure to disclose unless a fiduciary relationship could be established.176 This could result
in privity being replaced by materiality and causality in cases of misrepresentation, but being retained in cases of nondisclosure. 1 7'
Other than privity, the only serious obstacle to action under Florida's blue
sky law is that of jurisdiction. Rule lOb-5 requires the use of an instrumentality
of interstate commerce, and the Florida law parallels it in the sense that a
violation must take place within its jurisdiction in order to be actionable. 17s
This is the most serious obstacle for a securities action since jurisdiction will
often not lie for an extrastate transaction effectuated through the exchange. 1 79
Even if Florida can gain jurisdiction, the long arm statutes may not be sufficient to gain in personam jurisdiction over all the defendants.1's This in turn
may necessitate either an alternate forum where jurisdiction can be obtained
over all the parties or the inconvenience of separate state actions.
Despite the shortcomings of privity and jurisdictions, the Florida blue sky
law offers a more extensive remedy than rule lOb-5 in circumstances of negligence or a nontrading defendant. The plaintiff must remain alert, however, to
obstacles peculiar to the Florida blue sky law, especially the privity and jurisdictional problems. Privity, while potentially amenable to judicial waiver, is
still an element of the Florida action and jurisdiction will remain an immediate threshold concern. Once these obstacles are surmounted, the plaintiff
will have a cause of action as powerful as rule 1Ob-5 before it was restricted.
ACTION UNDER FLORIDA COMMON LAW

The other alternative to an action under rule lOb-5 is an action under common law, and the most efficacious action under Florida common law in this

context is an action for negligent misrepresentation. This is primarily due to
the elements of action for negligent misrepresentation, which allow the plaintiff
176. See Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1108, 1115 (1980). If the Florida courts followed the federal trend in relaxing privity, it is unlikely that they would go beyond the present
state of the law. The Florida courts have already taken this position in derivative suits and held
that there is no cause of action absent a breach of a fiduciary duty. See Schein v. Chasen, 313
So. 2d 739, 744 (Fla. 1975). Cf. Twomey v. Mitchum, 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 711 (1968) (California
court applying California blue sky law held the defendant liable in a case of nondisclosure
because a fiduciary relationship existed). Florida courts have found fiduciary relationships
that would support liability. See Etheredge v. Barrow, 102 So. 2d 660, 662 (Fla. 1958); Flight
Equip. & Eng'r Corp. v. Shelton, 103 So. 2d 615, 626-27 (Fla. 1958); Citizen's State Bank v.
Adams, 140 Fla. 578, 583, 193 So. 281, 283 (1939); Renpack Inc. v. Oppenheimer, 104 So. 2d
642, 644 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1958).
177. Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1108, 1115 (1980).
178. See 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1979). The federal rule has jurisdiction only over those
defendants engaging in interstate commerce. Florida's blue sky law, like all its statutes, can
extend only to the limit of its long arm statutes.
179. See Bartell, supra note 20. Jurisdictional problems are extremely severe in the context of an exchange. Because the exchange and the opposite party are usually both outside
the state and have no contact with it, most state long arm statutes are insufficient to gain
jurisdiction. Id. at 463 n.32.
180. Id. at 463. The problems are accentuated if there are multiple defendants.
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to circumvent many of the problems that prevent action under federal law. As
was true of an action under Florida's blue sky law, however, an action for
negligent misrepresentation, while advantageous, also presents challenges not
present in rule lOb-5.
An action for negligent misrepresentation may prove extremely useful
where a lack of scienter prevents the plaintiff from bringing action under federal law.' 8 ' While federal law requires that the defendant have knowledge of

the falsity of his representation, an action for negligent misrepresentation does
not require actual knowledge, only that the defendant should have known. 8 2
This negligence standard is advantageous in a corporate setting where it may
be difficult to prove an insider actually knew his representation was false, but
circumstances may support an inference that regardless of his actual knowledge,
he was negligent in making the representation.' 83 In Cameron v. Outdoor Resorts of America Inc.,8 4 the Fifth Circuit pointed out to the plaintiffs that this
action would provide them with a viable state law alternative to the federal
acion. Having been unable to prove scienter on the part of the defendants, an
action for negligent misrepresentation would present a much lighter burden. If
the plaintiffs could show that under the circumstances the defendants should
have known their representations were false, they could meet that burden in
the state action. 8 5 The action for negligent misrepresentation, therefore, presents a noteworthy alternative to the plaintiff shut out of federal court by the
scienter requirement.
Though the plaintiff is relieved of the burden of showing an intent to defraud on the part of the defendant, he will have to establish that the defendant

intended to induce the plaintiff to act. 88 The intent to induce action does not
fall under the negligence standard that applies to the intent to defraud, and the
181. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). Florida's common law takes
a minority position and allows negligent misrepresentation to be actionable. See Kutner v.
Kalish, 173 So. 2d 763, 765 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1965). Florida's position rejects the majority view
which requires scienter for any form of misrepresentation to be actionable. See Derry v. Peek,
14 A.C. 337 (1889). See generally W. PRossER, supra note 55, at 705.
182. See Ostreyko v. Morton Org. Inc., 310 So. 2d 316, 318 (Fla. 3d D.G.A. 1975). The
courts applying Florida law have held negligent misrepresentation to be tantamount to
actionable fraud. Id. Accord, Bobby Jones Garden Apts. Inc. v. Suleski, 391 F.2d 172, 177 (5th
Cir. 1968).
183. See Kutner v. Kalish, 173 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1965). There are five elements of
action required for negligent misrepresentation that are recognized by courts applying Florida
law. They are misrepresentation (or nondisclosure) of a material fact, misrepresentation where
the defendant should have known of its falsity, intention to induce the plaintiff to act,
justifiable reliance by the plaintiff and resultant injury. Id. at 765. See also Watson v. Jones,
41 Fla. 241, 25 So. 678, 682 (1899); Wheeler v. Baars, 33 Fla. 696, 15 So. 584, 588 (1894). These
elements are identical to the elements of action for common law fraud except that fraud requires actual knowledge of falsity by the defendant.
184. 608 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1979).
185. Id. at 194. The circuit court used the language of fraud, but it was subsuming
negligent misrepresentation to be under the law of fraud in Florida. The court recognized
that while the plaintiffs could not show scienter and were precluded from action under rule
lOb-5, they could meet the standards for Florida's common law. Id. at 195.
186. See Kutner v. Kalish, 173 So. 2d 763, 765 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1965). See generally
W. PRossER, supra note 54, at 686.
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plaintiff can only meet this burden by showing the defendant had "actual"
intent.187 In practice this is not a heavy burden; it is reasonable to conclude that
most representations in the securities field are more than mere off-hand remarks.ss Moreover, while the intent to induce action element does present a
burden for the plaintiff, it is much easier to prove by inference than the intent
to defraud. 8 9 The different burdens presented by the scienter and the intent to
induce action elements weigh decidedly in favor of the state cause of action. 19 0
A more difficult situation may exist, however, where the case is one of failure
to disclose rather than misrepresentation. Even if the defendant's intent to induce plaintiff's action can be shown, the courts will not generally impose
liability unless there was a close relationship between the parties. In Logan v.
Arnold,'91 for example, the plaintiff was defrauded by defendant's failure to
92
disclose the full value of the stock which he had purchased from the plaintiff.
Because the parties were in a close relationship and not at arm's length, the
court held the defendant liable. 9sa Later cases have relied on Logan to disallow
liability where the parties did not have a close relationship. 94 This has led to a
general rule that the plaintiff must show there was a fiduciary relationship between the parties before there will be recovery for damages resulting from non195
disclosure.
187. See Poliakoff v. National Emblem Ins. Co., 249 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1971).
Whereas the intent to defraud can be fulfilled by a showing of negligence, the intent to induce
action remains a strict element of action. Id. at 478. The defendant may not have known his
representation was false, but he must have made it with the purpose of inducing the plaintiff to act. A mere negligent inducement will not suffice.
188. See, e.g., Cameron v. Outdoor Resorts of America Inc., 608 F.2d 187, 192 (5th Cir.
1979). The representations made here are fairly typical; they were made with the purpose of
inducing plaintiff to buy campsites. Factual analysis of securities violations cases show this to
be generally true. In fact, if the plaintiff can establish reasonable reliance on his part, he
will have gone a long way to showing the intent to induce action. A representation that can
be reasonably relied on is likely to be one seriously made with the intent to affect the hearer.
See Logan v. Arnold, 82 Fla. 237, 239-40, 89 So. 551, 552 (1921).
189. See Logan v. Arnold, 82 Fla. 237, 239-40, 89 So. 551, 552 (1921).
190. See, e.g., Cameron v. Outdoor Resorts of America Inc., 608 F.2d 187, 196 (5th Cir.
1979). The plaintiffs could not show scienter and were precluded from bringing federal
action. Id. at 194. They were able to show intent to induce action from the same facts and
so were able to bring successful action under negligent misrepresentation which does not
require scienter. Id.
191. 82 Fla. 237, 89 So. 551 (1921).
192. Id. at 239, 89 So. at 553.
193. Id.
194. Logan v. Arnold imposed liability because there was a fiduciary relationship. Other
cases have followed this rule by holding the inverse, that there is no liability absent such a
relationship. It is important to remember, however, that the requirement to be in a fiduciary
relationship applies to cases of nondisclosure only and not to ordinary misrepresentation. See
Ramel v. Chasebrook Constr. Co., 135 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1961). In this case the court
held that in the absence of a fiduciary relationship, mere nondisclosure is ordinarily not
actionable unless an artifice or chicanery is used to prevent the plaintiff's inquiry. Id. at 882.
See also Watson v. Jones, 41 Fla. 241, 254, 25 So. 678, 682 (1899) (liability was imposed after
a fiduciary relationship was established).
195. See W. PROSSER, supra note 60, at 697. There are two other circumstances that will
support liability in a case of nondisclosure. The first is where the speaker makes a representa-
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This special relationship between the parties is also necessary in an action
for negligent misrepresentation, but to a lesser degree than for nondisclosure.
While nothing as stringent as a face to face transaction or a fiduciary relation-

ship is required, the plaintiff still must show some form of privity to recover. 9 6
This is the major obstacle faced by a plaintiff in this action and is the most
likely source of problems.

97

For example, while the courts have found enough

of a relationship to support liability where the misrepresentations were made
by corporate officers or directors to their shareholders or creditors,

no privity, at least to this degree, relief remains

98

if there is

in doubt. 99

In an early Florida case, Beach v. Williamson,200 a director was held liable
to the shareholders and creditors for his misrepresentations in inducing a trans-

fer of corporate assets to him.201 Here the fiduciary duty of a director to the
shareholders and his relationship to an outside creditor satisfied the require-

ment of privity, but it is significant that the defendant had an active part in the
transaction. If he had not been a trader in the transaction, it appears doubtful

that the court would have imposed liability. 202
As applied to the context of a securities exchange, the rationale that some
privity should be required would make it extremely difficult to support a finding of negligent misrepresentation against both nontrading tippers and other
parties who trade through a broker.203 In a situation where misrepresentation
tion, but only tells part of the facts and does not disclose enough to keep his words from
being misleading. Id. at 696. The second is where the defendant has special knowledge not
available to the plaintiff and is aware that the plaintiff is under a misapprehension but does
nothing to correct it. Id. at 697.
196. If the defendant had a face to face transaction with the plaintiff, the requirement
of privity is obviously fulfilled. If there has not been a face to face transaction there must be
at least some type of relationship between the parties. In Beach v. Williamson, 78 Fla. 611,
83 So. 860 (1920), for example, the relationship between the director of a corporation and its
creditors was enough to fulfill the privity requirement, even though the director was not in
a fiduciary relationship with the creditors, nor had been involved in a face to face transaction
with them. Id. at 619, 88 So. at 862-63.
If there is no direct contact between the parties, the plaintiff is treated as a third party
and privity becomes more difficult to establish. The general rule is to limit liability to those
plaintiffs which the defendant had special reason to anticipate. See Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1981). See also RsTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF
ToRrs §§531-36 (1965). See generally W. PRossER, supra note 55, at 702-08.
197. See Peek v. Gurney, L.R. 6E &I App. 877 (1878). Liability for a fraudulent prospectus
was limited to action by the original investors and all were considered to lack the requisite
privity.
198. See, e.g., Beach v. Williamson, 78 Fla. 611, 88 So. 860 (1920).
199. See, e.g., Ruden v. Medalie, 294 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1974). Accord, W. PRossmt,
supra note 60, at 702-08.
200. 78 Fla. 611, 88 So. 860 (1920).
201. Id. at 619, 88 So. at 861-62.
202. Id. at 612-15, 83 So. at 860-62. Here the defendant received the assets directly from
the plaintiffs. If he had caused them to be transferred to a third party instead of himself the
case would have been closer. Cf. Ruden v. Medalie, 294 So. 2d 403 (Fla. d D.C.A. 1974) (where
the defendant did not actually trade, but nonetheless took part in the transaction).
208. See Logan v. Arnold, 82 Fla. 237, 89 So. 551 (1921). Liability was imposed because
they were not at arm's length in the transaction. Id. at 241-42, 89 So. at 558. It follows that, if
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was made through a prospectus, the rationale of Beach 20 4 would extend the
requisite privity and liability on the issuers of the prospectus, but only in favor
of the original recipients. 205 Parties who received the prospectus third-hand
would have difficulty establishing privity and would probably not be granted
relief.2 °0 An action for negligent misrepresentation remains a potent source of
relief for a defrauded plaintiff, but it is limited somewhat by the requirement
of privity, especially in cases of nondisclosure. Shareholders and creditors at the
time of the misrepresentation have a good cause of action against corporate
officers and directors,2 7 while others will be limited to actions against those with
whom they had face to face transactions.
Once the plaintiff has established the elements of action for negligent misrepresentation, it may still not be actionable if it is seen as a representation of
opinion rather than fact.20 s Although there are exceptions,209 Florida law has
long rejected any action for a false opinion or a false estimate of future value.
The general rule is illustrated by the case of Sparks v. State,210 in which the
defendant represented that the stock offered for sale would triple in value after
six months. When the plaintiff's expectations were not fulfilled, he brought suit
under Florida's blue sky law for fraudulent sale of securities.211 While this was
not a common law action, it rested in part on common law principles which the
court applied to deny relief. 21 2 The court held that the defendant's statements
they had been at arm's length the action would have failed. These problems will be exacerbated if the deception is nondisclosure rather than misrepresentation. See note 196 supra.
204. 72 Fla. 611, 83 So. 860 (1919).
205. Id. at 619, 83 So. at 862-63. The rationale of Beach established a fiduciary relationship because the parties were not at arm's length. The converse would also be true, that if
the transaction were at arm's length, the requisite relationship would be absent, preventing
liability. As applied to a prospectus, the original recipients would be in direct relationship to
the issuers and under the Beach analysis could bring action for misrepresentation. Parties
beyond the initial recipients would not have this relationship and would fall under the
Ultramares doctrine. See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E.
441 (1931). They would have a cause of action only if they were part of that class of recipients which the defendants could have reasonably anticipated would receive the prospectus.
206. See note 205 supra.
207. 72 Fla. at 619, 83 So. at 862-63.
208. See Vokes v. Arthur Murray Inc., 212 So. 2d 906, 908-09 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1968). The
general rule in Florida is that a misrepresentation of opinion is not actionable. Id. See also
W. PROSSER, supra note 60, at 728.
209. Vokes v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 212 So. 2d 906, 908-09 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1968). The rule
does not apply where there is a fiduciary relationship between the parties or where an
artifice or trick is employed by the representer to prevent the plaintiff from discovering the
true facts. Other exceptions are where the parties are not at arm's length or where the representee does not have an equal opportunity to become appraised of the falsity of the
opinion. Id.
210. 256 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1972).
211. Id. at 538.
212. Id. It was easier to find liability under the blue sky law than under common law.
Therefore the fact that liability was denied under the blue sky law makes the principle that
an expression of opinion is not a basis for liability even stronger in the common law which
has a higher burden of proof. See FLA. STAT. §517.171 (1979). See also llc H. SowARDs &
N. HiRscH, BUSINEss ORGANIZATIONS,

BLUE SKY REGULATIONS 6-5
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were not made in connection with a material fact, but were an expression of
opinion regarding a future event and as such could not be the basis for liability. 213

While the holding of Sparks v. State is the general rule in Florida, there are

exceptions that allow the plaintiff relief even if the misrepresentation consists
merely of opinion. If a fiduciary relationship exists between the parties, an
opinion may be actionable misrepresentation, but a factual analysis of the cases
indicates that the courts will only apply this exception when there has been
truly egregious behavior on the part of the defendant.214 For example, the
fiduciary relationship of a corporate director to shareholders was not enough
to invoke this exception when the opinion was given to parties able to conduct
an independent investigation. 2sr Apparently, even though there is a fiduciary
relationship, only when the defendant has a great advantage over the plaintiff

and the plaintiff has no effective means of protection will the courts find an
opinion to be actionable. 16
The second exception to the Sparks v. State2 1 7 rule is that of misrepresentation of the fact that an opinion is believed by the party making it. The opinion
itself may not be actionable, but there is a secondary implied representation

which is made concurrently with the opinion, a representation that the opinion

holder actually believes the opinion at the time of his representation. 218 No
showing of a fiduciary relationship is necessary here. All the plaintiff is required
Provident Trust Co., 119 Fla. 718, 162 So. 323, 333 (1935) (placed a heavy burden of proof on
the plaintiff in an action for common law fraud).
213. 256 So. 2d at 538. See also Bower v. Selecman, 52 So. 2d 680, 681 (Fla. 1951) (minority
shareholders bought out the majority shareholder's stock after he made representations that
he could obtain additional franchises, and the court held this to be a rash statement and as
such not actionable); Evans v. Gray, 215 So. 2d 40, 41 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1968) (a director was
absolved from liability in his representation of the value of corporate assets since it viewed
this xepresentation as mere opinion). Accord, Bissett v. Ply Gem Indus. Inc., 533 F.2d 142, 145
(5th Cir. 1976); Brod v. Jernigan, 188 So. 2d 575, 579 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1966).
214. See Vokes v. Arthur Murray Inc., 212 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1968). Misrepresentation of opinion was used by the defendant to sell a widow over $31,000 worth of dancing
lessons. Id. at 907. The court found the requisite relationship to uphold liability. Id. at 909.
,See also Logan v. Arnold, 82 Fla. 237, 89 So. 551 (1921). A corporate vice president misrepresented by opinion the value of corporate stock which the widow of the former corporate
president held. Liability was upheld by the court finding a semifiduciary relationship between
the parties Id. at 243, 89 So. at 553.
215. See 256 So. 2d 537. Here even though the misrepresentation was by a director to
corporate shareholders and concerned the value of the corporate stock, the action was dismissed. Id. at 538. A major factor in the court's decision was the ability of the plaintiffs to
conduct an independent evaluation of the security. Id. See also Bower v. Selecman, 52 So. 2d
680 (Fla. 1951).
216. 256 So. 2d 537.
217. Id. The rule is that, in general, a misrepresentation of opinion is not actionable. Id.
at 538.
218. See Watson v. Jones, 41 Fla. 241, 25 So. 678 (1899). This is not a misrepresentation of
opinion, but of fact. The fact misrepresented is that the defendant actually held the opinion
when he made it. If he does not, the misrepresentation is actionable. Id. at 254, 25 So. at 682.
See also Bisset v. Ply Gem Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1976). The Fifth Circuit would
hold defendants liable under Florida law if they had expressed an opinion when facts in their
possession would make that opinion false. Id. at 146,
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to show is that the defendant did not believe or hold the opinion when he made
it. This can be inferred from circumstances and is a potent counter to the defense that the misrepresentation was mere opinion. 19
The foregoing applies primarily to actions against a principal but will apply
to actions against an aider and abettor with some significant additions. An
action for aiding negligent misrepresentation becomes as difficult as an action
for fraud because, in addition to all the elements of negligent misrepresentation, scienter must also be shown. 220 This makes an action against an aider even
more difficult than an action under federal law. Although rule 1Ob-5 requires
scienter, it does not require the privity necessary for negligent misrepresentation.21 The common law action is further debilitated by the requirement, not
present in rule 1Ob-5, that an aider must have performed some significant act
22 2
to assist the misrepresentation. The Florida case of Ruden v. Medalie
illustrates that this act must be fairly significant in order to give rise to liability.
In that case, a purchaser of debentures brought action against the attorney who
signed the debentures as an aider and abettor.223 The court held that the mere
signing of the securities was not an act intended to induce the plaintiff to
purchase and, therefore, would not support liability.224 The court apparently
sought a more active assistance even though there was scienter and privity on
the part of the defendant.225 In most circumstances, an action for negligent
misrepresentation will not be as efficacious against an aider as it is against a
principal due to the added elements of scienter and significant assistance.
After a plaintiff meets the elements of action and brings suit, whether
against a principal or an aider, it is crucial to remember that it is a negligence
action that is being brought. Florida's law of comparative negligence will apply
to this action as with any other action based on a negligence claim independent
of the blue sky laws.2 26 If the plaintiff is seen as having not acted to safeguard
219. 533 F.2d at 146. If plaintiff can show that facts in the possession of the defendant
would invalidate the opinion, the inference raised will support a finding of misrepresentation.

Id. This is close to a negligence standard and the defendant will be held liable if it can be
shown that he knew or should have known that his opinion was false or if it was made without knowledge of truth or falsity. Id. at 145. The general rule of no action for mere opinion
is disfavored by the courts, hence the many exceptions.
220. The elements of the two actions are identical except for scienter which is only part
of the action for fraud. See Bobby Jones Garden Apts., Inc. v. Suleski, 391 F.2d 172, 177 (5th
Cir. 1968).

221. See notes 97 &210 supra.
222. 294 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1974).
223.

Id. at 406.

224. Id.
225. Id. The defendant knew the debentures were not what they purported to be and had
face to face contact with the plaintiff in the transaction. The defendant did not have privity
of trade however and rendered only minimal assistance to the representation. Id. Scienter is
not enough for an aider to negligently mistrepresent; there must be significant assistance and
the defendant must engage in some acts which induce the purchaser to purchase. Id.
226. FLA. STAT. §517.211 (1979). Contributory negligence is not a defense to the Florida
blue sky laws. All that need be shown is a violation of the statute and defendant's only defense
is to either deny the violation or to plead an exemption to the statute. Comparative negligence
does apply to the common law actions, however, and can serve to reduce the plaintiff's recovery. See Ruden v. Medalie, 294 So. 2d 403, 406 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1974).
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his own interests, the claim of being induced by the misrepresentation will be
weighed against the duty to use reasonable care in one's own behalf.227 As
applied to securities misrepresentation, Florida's law of comparative negligence
requires not only that there be justifiable reliance on the defendant's representation,228 but also that the plaintiff exercised due care on his own behalf.229 Even
if all the elements of action are met, the plaintiff's own negligence may serve to
reduce his recovery.
An action for negligent misrepresentation offers the plaintiff an excellent
chance to circumvent the scienter requirement which may cripple a federal
action. The plaintiff must be aware, however, of the other elements of action
not present in the federal law, and recognize that as it is a negligence-based
claim, comparative negligence principles apply. The plaintiff's major obstacle
is showing privity, an obstacle more difficult in cases of nondisclosure. If this
obstacle can be surmounted, the state action offers a significant alternative to
those who can show privity but not scienter. Under those circumstances, the
state action is more appropriate than the now restrictive federal law.
Fraud and breach of fiduciary duty are the other common law actions
available to the plaintiff in a securities deception case. Neither is as favorable
as negligent misrepresentation because the elements required are often too
rigorous to afford a meaningful alternative to federal action. Both actions are
useful mainly as additional grounds for relief that will provide punitive damages, but generally they will not be supportable as independent actions.230
An action for common law fraud requires that the plaintiff show both
scienter and privity.2 31 If scienter is not an obstacle in a particular case, rule
227. Id.
228. See Kutner v. Kalish, 173 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1965). Justifiable reliance is an

element of action totally separate from the doctrine of comparative negligence and is required
even in intentional fraud. Id. at 765. The element of justifiable reliance does not effect
whether the plaintiff exercised due care in his own behalf, but is concerned with the narrower
question of whether it was justifiable to rely on the representation in the circumstances in
which it was made. The plaintiff could have justifiably relied on the representation and still
be contributorily negligent if he neglected to exercise due care outside of the immediate
circumstances of the representation. See also Bobby Jones Garden Apts., Inc. v. Suleski, 391
F.2d 172, 177 (5th Cir. 1968).
229. See 294 So. 2d at 406. The plaintiff justifiably relied on the defendant's representation
of the debentures; there was nothing in the immediate circumstances to belie the representation. Id. at 405. The defendant did have the defense of comparative negligence however, in
that the plaintiff failed to exercise due care in her own behalf in the totality of the transaction by not investigating the credit and solvency of the corporation whose debentures she
purchased. Id. at 406. This defense is available in an action for negligent misrepresentation
but not in an action for fraud which is an intentional tort. See generally W. PRossER, supra

note 60, at 716.
230. See notes 245 &253 infra.
231. See Joiner v. McCullers, 158 Fla. 562, 28 So. 2d 823 (1947). "A false representation of
a material fact, made with knowledge of its falsity, to a person ignorant thereof, with intention that it shall be acted upon, followed by reliance upon and by action thereon amounting
to substantial change of position, is a fraud of which the law will take cognizance." Id. at
564-65, 28 So. 2d at 824 (quoting Wheeler v. Baars, 33 Fla. 696, 15 So. 584 (1894)). The
Florida supreme court included the elements of privity and scienter in this definition of
fraud. First, the representation had to be .madeto the person ignorant of its falsity, which
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lOb-5 will often apply in the first instance,232 making the state action superfluous. If rule lOb-5 still does not apply though scienter can be shown, the
plaintiff must still go on to prove privity in order to establish a claim in
fraud .23 3 This will often be an insurmountable barrier if the transaction was
consummated through an exchange or if redress is sought for market manipulation absent a purchase or sale. 23 4 Because of privity and scienter, an action for
fraud is more difficult than action under rule lOb-5 and, therefore, usually is
2 35
relegated to an ancillary status.
An action for breach of fiduciary duty by a corporate officer or director to
corporate shareholders, like an action for fraud, may be useful in only a minority of cases. If the plaintiff can show individual malfeasance by an officer or
director, an action for breach of fiduciary duty may be available..2 36 Unfortunately beyond that this action has probably been foreclosed by the Florida
supreme court in Schein v. Chasen.23 7 In that case the court rejected a derivative
suit for a leak of corporate information to a securities broker and the broker's
subsequent misuse of that information. 23 8 The court held that absent "harm to
239
the corporation," derivative suits are inappropriate.
implies privity. Second, it had to be made with the knowledge of its falsity, which implies
scienter. See Bobby Jones Garden Apts., Inc. v. Suleski, 391 F.2d 172, 177 (5th Cir. 1968);
Poliakoff v. National Emblem Ins. Co., 249 So. 2d 477, 478 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1971); Kutner v.
Kalish, 173 So. 2d 763, 765 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1965). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 60, at
686.
232. Cameron v. Outdoor Resorts of America Inc., 608 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1979). The plaintiffs were forced to state law because they could not establish scienter. Id. at 194. If they could
have established scienter, action under the Act would have gone forward making state law
unnecessary. Once they were forced under state law the same scienter requirement that defeated action under the Act defeated an action for fraud, forcing them to use negligent misrepresentation. Id. at 195.
233. See note 231 supra. See McGregor v. Provident Trust Co., 119 Fla. 718, 744, 162 So.

323, 333 (1935).
234. See Washburn & Steig, supra note 20, at 776. The inability of action for fraud to
deal with deception in the securities market was a motivating factor for passage of the Act.
When a trade is made through an exchange the requisite privity is lacking and an action for
fraud will not lie. Likewise, if there is no purchase or exchange, fraud becomes an extremely
difficult ground for relief. See, e.g., Ruden v. Medalie, 294 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1974).
235. Both actions require scienter, but only fraud requires privity. See text accompanying
note 97 supra. See generally Note, supra note 4, at 1215.
236. See Beach v. Williamson, 78 Fla. 611, 83 So. 860 (1920). Usually breach of fiduciary
duty can be supported where the officer or director has usurped a corporate opportunity or
has been guilty of self dealing at the corporation's expense. In Beach the defendant, a
director, defrauded the corporation into selling him corporate property. Id. at 614-16, 83 So.
at 861-62. This type of activity, where the director gains to the corporation's detriment, will
always support a derivative action by the shareholders. Id. at 622, 83 So. at 864. It is important to remember that no matter how well supported, derivative action is only available
to shareholders and not to the general public. This means that, in the securities context, a
shareholder at the time of the deception has standing, but one, who becomes a shareholder
due to deception is in a more questionable position. One who refrains from becoming a
shareholder has no standing at all.
237. 313 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1975).

238. Id. at 739-46.
239. Id. at 746. See also, Palma v. Zerbey, 189 So. 2d 510, 511 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1966);
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The court's action will preclude most derivative actions for securities abuse
because the corporation is rarely harmed by these activities. Typically, the
corporation has not traded and so has not suffered damages, leaving the plaintiff in the difficult position of having to allege intangible harm such as loss of
goodwill. In the rare case in which the corporation has traded in securities, it
usually has benefited from the inside information, and under the analysis of
Schein v. Chasen a derivative action could not be maintained.24 0 The plaintiff
would only have a chance for success if he could show self-dealing by insiders
at corporate expense resulting in either a loss of corporate opportunity or direct
harm to the corporate entity. Otherwise, like an action for fraud, an action for
breach of fiduciary duty has limited effectiveness in securing relief for securities
fraud.
Even though actions for fraud or breach of fiduciary duty are not tremendously effective avenues for relief in securities fraud, an action for negligent
misrepresentation is. Counsel, representing a plaintiff defrauded in a securities
transaction, should not neglect common law alternatives, especially action for
negligent misrepresentation. All forms of common law action suffer from the
inconvenience of having to establish state jurisdiction and the difficulty of
showing privity. These disadvantages are outweighed by the lack of other
elements, such as scienter, which can restrict rule lOb-5. Although the common
law has been eclipsed by rule lOb-5, the use of the rule has passed its apogee
and is now in decline. Action by common law should once again assume a more
primary role in providing relief for securities fraud.
CONCLUSION

Assuming that the present restrictive trend of the federal courts in applying
the Act is a permanent phenomenon, state action, both statutory and common
law, will have to provide an increasing share of relief for securities fraud.
Fortunately, for the most part, Florida's statutory and common law are able to
meet this demand and can provide relief. In fact, the Florida blue sky laws are,
in many ways, a codification of the earlier liberal federal interpretations of the
Act and will support relief in much the same manner.
The main difficulty in both the common and statutory law of Florida, other
than jurisdictional problems which are present in any state action, is the problem of privity. The effectiveness of Florida's actions would be markedly increased if the elements of causality and materiality were adopted as a replacement for privity. This is essentially the federal solution, and if implemented
in Florida, would protect Florida investors nearly as effectively as did the Act
at its zenith.
Any changes made in this area should apply only to the blue sky law and
not to the common law. The deletion of the privity requirement from negligent
misrepresentation, for example, would have ramifications beyond securities
Maronek v. Atlantis Hotel, 148 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1962). Cf. Schein v. Chasen, 478
F.2d 817, 822-23 (2d Cir. 1973) (where the Second Circuit held that Florida would not require
damage to the corporation in a derivative suit), vacated, 416 U.S. 886 (1974).
240. 313 So. 2d 739, 746 (Fla. 1975). The court applied this doctrine in a securities action
to deny relief.
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fraud and would expand this action beyond desirable limits of liability.2 41 The
blue sky laws are specifically tailored to securities violations, however, and an
expansion would not affect other areas of the law. This change would result in
a Florida securities law that would be able to carry out the intent of the legislature242 in many cases where it is now ineffectual. Together, Florida's statutory
and common law offer the plaintiff a good alternative to the Act, and with
slight modification of the statutes, this alternative would become even more
viable.
RoBERT BUKER
241. See, e.g., Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
The problem of limiting liability in negligence actions was part of the policy behind this
decision. Expansion of the limits of liability for negligence has far reaching consequences and
should only be done cautiously.
242. See Data Lease Financial Corp. v. Barad, 291 So. 2d 608, 612 (Fla. 1974). The intent
of the Florida blue sky law is to protect investors. Both judicial and legislative action should
seek to implement that intent by correcting existing deficiencies in the law that prevent relief.
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